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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARNELL H. WELCHMAN and EVA 
B. WELCHMAN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
MERRILL J. WOOD, d/b/a Wood Real-
ty Company, and MILO D. CARTER, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Case 
No. 9160 
This case has once before been before this tribunal. 
See Case No. 8718. Respondents again respectfully request 
the court to review the brief record to be advised of the fact 
situation. Having received all proffered evidence the first 
trial court felt moved to say: "There was no real agree-
ment by way of parole-nothing that was not anticipated 
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In the written agreement. Plaintiffs have indicated that 
there simply was 'puffing' talk". The second trial court 
having heard the statement of counsel as to all that would 
be attempted to be proved and having heard the testimony 
of plaintiff Arnell H. Welchman dismissed the case a second 
time for want of a cause of action and explained to the jury 
that if all that were claimed by way of proffered evidence 
were true he would have to dismiss the action because all 
that defendants contracted to do was done and in the testi-
mony most favorable to the plaintiffs there were no further 
covenants nor enforceable obligations on the part of · the 
defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 8th day of March, 1956, appellants 
entered into a Sales Agency Contract with the respondent 
MerriU J. Wood Realty Company. Said contract stated in 
part: "In consideration of your agreement to list the prop-
erty described on the reverse side of this contract with the 
Multiple Listing Bureau of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board 
. . . I hereby grant you . . . the exclusive right to sell or 
exchange said property ... if you find a buyer who is ready, 
willing and able to buy or exchange said property ... or if 
said property is sold or exchanged . . . I agree to pay the 
commission recommended by the Salt Lake Real Estate 
Board ... " See Exhibit D-1. 
Appellant Arnell H. Welchman deposes and says that 
the house so listed for sale or trade was in fact traded due 
to the efforts of respondents. (Dep. pg 6, 7) Appellants 
-------------... _ .. ,. .... ------
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3 
lived in the house that they traded for, ( Dep. pg 7) and 
traded the said listed house for the top listing price and 
received the equivalent of $SOOO as a down payment. ( Dep. 
pg 8, 9) The known and contractual sales commission was 
paid ( Dep. pg 11) with no protest and recognizing the same 
as a contractual obligation. ( Dep. pg 12) Appellant de-
poses and says that to his knowledge there never was any 
other written contract than the above mentioned Sales 
Agency Contract. ( Dep. pg 43) 
During the period of time that said contract was being 
executed one of the appellants worked in the respondent's 
real estate office as a licensed real estate salesman. (Dep. 
pg 18-19) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
DEFENDANT, MERRILL J. WOOD, D/B/A WOOD REAL-
TY COMPANY, AND DEFENDANT, MILO D. CARTER, 
A SALESMAN THEREFORE, FULLY PERFORMED AND 
COMPLETED ANY AND ALL CONTRACTUAL OBLIGA-
TIONS ENTERED INTO WITH THE PLAINTIFFS HERE-
IN TO THE MUTUAL BENEFIT OF PLAINTIFFS AND 
DEFENDANTS AS SPECIFIED AND AGREED TO 
THEREIN. ( R-6) 
II 
THERE IS NO PROFFERED EVIDENCE THAT THE 
ADMITTED CONTRACT WAS ALTERED OR MODIFIED 
IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DEVELOP NEW RESPONSI-
BILITIES UPON THE DEFENDANTS. 
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III 
THERE IS NO PROFFERED EVIDENCE THAT THE 
PARTIES ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT WHICH 
REFERS TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ADMIT-
TED CONTRACT BUT WHICH WAS COLLATERAL TO 
ITS MAIN PURPOSE INDICATING WITH REASONABLE 
CERTAINTY AN INTENTION TO ENTER INTO A CON-
TRACT. OF WARRANTY. 
IV 
IF THERE WERE ANY EVIDENCE OF A NEW CON-
TRACT OF WARRANTY SUCH A CONTRACT WOULD 
BE UNENFORCEABLE BY WAY OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF 
PERFORMANCE. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
DEFENDANT, MERRILL J. WOOD, D/B/A WOOD REAL-
TY COMPANY, AND DEFENDANT, MILO D. CARTER, 
A SALESMAN THEREFORE, FULLY PERFORMED AND 
COMPLETED ANY AND ALL CONTRACTUAL OBLIGA-
TIONS ENTERED INTO WITH THE PLAINTIFFS HERE-
IN TO THE MUTUAL BENEFIT OF THE PLAINTIFFS 
AND DEFENDANTS AS SPECIFIED AND AGREED TO 
THEREIN. 
Upon the submission of the deposition of the plaintiff 
(R-15-26, and entire published deposition), the prelimi-
nary statement of counsel outlining all that is hoped to be 
-----------~-.. ,.,---~------ -
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proved concluding with the statement "And then we will 
present, to sum it up, Arnell Welchman to sort of reaffirm 
everything that we have already presented" (R 14); and 
finally upon the trial court's own recorded interogation 
(R 27-32) of he who was to "reaffirm everything", defend-
ant Arnell H. Welchman, the trial court held: 
"That contract has been consumated, and . . . (the 
form) is of no consequence because they actually agreed, and 
what the realtor was to do was to bring in a party who would 
trade with him, buy or trade. This man and the man brought 
in-this plaintiff and the man brought in did agree on a 
contract between themselves. The realtor brought them 
together, and I take it the realtor would be entitled to his 
commission even though these parties got together and 
settled on some deal other than the one the realtor was author-
ized to make for them, and he would be entitled to his fee 
because he brought them together. That contract is consu-
mated and is of no importance, and that contract was not 
breached." (R 21) 
To which statement and interpretation of the court 
counsel for appellants replied "That's right". (R 21) 
The record thus indicates some evidence that there is 
no contest as to the defendant's second affirmative defense. 
(R 6) 
II 
THERE IS NO PROFFERED EVIDENCE THAT THE AD-
MITTED CONTRACT WAS ALTERED OR MODIFIED IN 
SUCH A WAY AS TO DEVELOP NEW RESPONSIBILI-
TIES UPON THE DEFENDANTS. 
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In support of the notion that a change was wrought 
h d " d" in the admitted contract appellant quotes t e wor s assure 
and "guarantee" as they appear in plaintiff's testimony in the 
record. (R 16, 17, 18, 25, 31) Appellant admits in his 
brief, page 7, that he doesn't recall the language allegedly 
giving rise to these conclusions. 
The trial court countered this argument by saying and 
ruling " ... this fellow's (plaintiff) statement where he 
says 'He did guarantee to me a certain sum' That's a 
conclusion of law. He stated what he thought ... ". (R 20) 
These conclusions of law of the plaintiff do not prop· 
erly constitute any proffer of evidence of any change. of the 
admitted contract. 
That the trial court is correct in his above stated reply 
is evidenced by the generally accepted restatement of the law 
in the case Baker Community Hotel Co. v. Hotel and Res-
taurant et al, 207 P2nd 1129, 1131, 187 Or. 58, wherein 
the court said: 
"Conclusions are terms which do not deliniate the 
facts; they go no further than to recite the pleader's 
reaction to, or the inferences he draws from, undis-
closed facts". 
We, of course, have no quarrel with appellant's numer-
ous quotes from 12 Am ]ur, Contracts, and certainly agree 
with the quotation from page 777 
" . . . All contracts must be interpreted with reference 
to their subject matter ... " 
- ..... -.... ~-- ~·-·---- ---
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The only proffered admissable evidence in the instant case 
with reference to the subject matter of the contract is Exhibit 
D-1 wherein defendant agreed to find a buyer ready, willing 
and able to enter into a contract with plaintiffs. Of this the 
trial court said: "He did bring the parties . . . he did 
bring a man who was ready, willing and able to deal with 
the plaintiff. . . . I don't think there is any evidence stated 
here that would warrant the court to permit it to go to a 
jury or would justify the Supreme Court in holding that-on 
the statement made-there would exist a cause of action for 
breach of warranty". (R 21) 
In the light most favorable to the plaintiff the trial 
court affirms point number two when it says: "What was 
changed was the mind . . . (of the party) with regard to 
the third person. He did say when he told these people to 
bring him a man that he would deal with one only for 
cash, but he dealt to the contrary, but these, that is, the 
plaintiff's did that. These defendant's did bring a man 
with whom he dealt ... if he hadn't accepted it, these defend-
ant's wouldn't be entitled to a fee". (R 22) 
There is no proffered admissable evidence to the effect 
that the original and admitted contract was altered or modi-
fied in any way. 
III 
THERE IS NO PROFFERED EVIDENCE THAT THE 
PARTIES ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT WHICH RE-
FERS TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ADMITTED 
CONTRACT BUT WHICH WAS COLLATERAL TO ITS 
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MAIN PURPOSE INDICATING WITH REASONABLE 
CERTAINTY AN INTENTION TO ENTER INTO A CON-
TRACT OF WARRANTY. 
Our discussion of point two above wherein it is concluded 
that there is no proffered evidence of any alteration or modi-
fication of the admitted contract wherein new responsibilities 
might devolve upon defendants makes a discussion of this 
point unnecessary and repetitious. However, inasmuch as 
appellants have chosen to make the trial court's use of the 
term "warranty" the basis of their argument in this appeal, 
it would seem appropriate to mention it. 
"The term 'Warranty' has been defined as meaning 
an agreement which refers to the subject matter of 
the contract", says 17 C.J.S. pg 795-6, "but which 
is collateral to its main purpose ... but the language 
employed, when properly interpreted, must indicate 
with reasonable certainty, an intention to enter into 
a contract of warranty, or sucll intention must be 
clearly implied from the language used and the 
whole situation of the parties." 
Utah Statutes caution us more with reference to war-
ranty in U.C.A., 1953, 60-1-2: 
" ... No affirmation of value of goods, nor any state-
ment purporting to be a statement of the seller's 
opinion only, shall be considered warranty." 
Thus we conclude that if appellants are basing their 
cause of action upon the fact that defendants warranted 
the value of a uniform real estate contract, or the value of 
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a house, or its loan value, taken in payment in the matter of 
the exchange of properties, then they must proffer reason-
ably certain evidence of it. Even then the above statute 
indicates such statements may not be construed as war-
ranties. 
Plaintiff's answer to the court's query as to what alleged 
warranty was made hardly satisfies the demand of "reason-
ably certain intention to enter into a contract of warranty" 
when he replied: "I don't think I can give you the exact 
words". The court, even feeling "that all real estate sales-
men ought to be kicked in the pants when you can kick them," 
( R 22) could not make a jury question out of an alleged 
breach of warranty which alleged warranty arose as testi-
fied by the plaintiff and interpreted most favorably to 
him: " . . . they said it would go . . _ that they would be able 
to make the loan for us, that they had made loans in that area 
to houses i.e. they knew of loans that had been made in that 
area, and they couldn't see why ours wouldn't go". (R 30) 
This action is for breach of a warranty contract, not 
misrepresentation or tort. The opinion of the real estate 
broker, if any, as to value and the future activity of the 
parties does not constitute breach of . warranty. 
The court opinioned that in a real estate transaction the 
standard to constitute a warranty, if anything, would rise 
above the standard to constitute warranty in a sales contract 
involving personal property. Greater evidence is usually 
required of the sale of real estate and covenants therewith 
than the mere sale of personal property. In the testimony 
given, the court held that there was no purported warranty 
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with reference to what may happen in the future. Appel-
lant, who seeks to overthrow the trial court's decision, does 
not cite a single case in his brief to indicate error in said 
court's interpretation of the law or the application of it 
with reference to real estate. 
IV 
IF THERE WERE ANY EVIDENCE OF A NEW CON-
TRACT OF WARRANTY SUCH A CONTRACT WOULD 
BE UNENFORCEABLE BY WAY OF IMPOSSIBILITY 
OF PERFORMANCE. 
Inasmuch as the trial court held that there was no 
evidence of any unperformed obligations on the part of the 
defendants either as to breach of warranty or otherwise 
( R 36-7) this defense was never raised. 
It is raised here since under the authority of Burt and 
Carlquist Co. v. Marks et al, 53 Ut. 77, 177 P 224 (1918), 
some defenses may be waived by failure to assert at each 
opportunity. 
Plaintiff's plead, but fai~ even to make a proffer of 
proof, that defendant's guaranteed that plaintiff's could get 
an F. H. A. loan on the property the plaintiff's traded. 
Plaintiffs further plead that such a loan was impossible 
because of "substantial defect in the foundation of the 
house to be financed". (R 2) Plaintiffs thus admit that 
the claimed warranty was impossible of performance because 
of the law governing the Federal Housing Authority. One 
of the most generally accepted rules of contract law is that 
nonperformance is excused where performance is rendered 
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impossible by the law. In this connection, see Am. Law lnst. 
Restatement, Contracts, paragraphs 458, 599, 608. Carne-
gie Steel Co. v United States, 240 U.S. 156. 
One of the conditions implied in a contract is that the 
promisor shall not be compelled to perform if performance 
is rendered impossible by an act of the law. 12 Am ]ur 
pg 955. 
The California court in a well reasoned decision in 
Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal 289, 156 P 458, 
held that a thing is impossible in legal contemplation when 
it is not practical, and it is impractical when it can only be 
done at an excessive or unreasonable cost. 
CONCLUSION 
Upon the testimony proposed to the court to be entered 
and upon the testimony of the plaintiff - interpreted in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff- no cause of action for 
breach or warranty or otherwise is made against the defend-
ants. If such warranty were established performance would 
be excused as impossible and as impossible by operation of 
law. The trial court should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OSCAR W. MC CONKlE, JR. 
of the firm of 
MC CONKlE & MC CONKlE 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Respondents. 
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